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7As chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism (APPG), I have been determined to deliver action against anti-Jewish prejudice according to three key principles. 
Firstly, that non-Jews should lead the fight against antisemitism. Secondly, that the success 
we have in combating antisemtism can, should and will be used to fight all forms of racism 
and discrimination. Thirdly, that Parliament can and must set the national standard in these 
matters and do so across party lines.
I was therefore delighted for our APPG to play host to a symposium organised by the Pears 
Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London and the Centre on 
Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at Oxford University. Joining together with these two 
institutions allowed us to more effectively put the aforementioned principles into practice.  
This marks a new and necessary venture for our group, founded in the best traditions of 
policy development whereby scientific rigour informs political debate. Importantly for 
parliamentarians, this report pinpoints specific policy recommendations.
In an age where integration, cohesion and extremism are often the subject of media hype, 
political controversy and public frustration, I hope that this collection of essays and the policy 
recommendations which result from them will feed a different type of national discourse. 
The findings not only serve to reassure me that my guiding principles are correct, but that 
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9In this collection, we gather a series of short essays which call for a re-focusing of our national debate and our national and local policy on integration, cohesion and extremism. Our 
essential starting point is the principle that parliament has the opportunity and responsibility 
to take a lead in combating racism and religious intolerance. However, we extend this principle 
to set a new agenda for cross-party parliamentary work to tackle intolerance.
The essays presented here arise from the presentations made at a symposium held at the 
House of Commons on 8 May 2013, hosted by the All Party Group Against Antisemitism 
and planned jointly by the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, based at Birkbeck, 
University of London, and by the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), 
University of Oxford. Our aim was to reflect on the government’s integration strategy and 
its Prevent strategies and to do so in the light of both contemporary developments and 
recent scholarship. 
In the course of our work that day it became clear to us that extremist political movements 
which target ethnic and religious minorities, as well as hate crime directed against Muslims 
and Jews, need to be seen, understood and combatted as interconnected phenomena. It is 
for these reasons that antisemitism must be addressed alongside other racisms and forms 
of exclusion.
At the same time, antisemitism, racism and intolerance must be grasped and tackled in 
their full social context. This means understanding the ways in which social disadvantage 
and racial injustice, alienation and disempowerment, generate divisive social relations and 
political movements that feed on intolerance and hate. Intolerance and racial hatred must be 
resisted not only as they arise but also by addressing their deeper social and political roots. 
INTRODUCTION
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The essays collected here develop these insights. They provide the best evidence on the 
structures of disadvantage which drive grievances in British society, on the drivers and extent 
of different forms of extremism, and on the processes of integration that emerge from the 
experiences, attitudes and aspirations of migrant and minority populations in Britain today.
The contributions by Rob Berkeley and Anthony Heath lay bare the penalties faced by specific 
ethnic and religious minorities in achieving equal outcomes in the labour market, education 
and other domains. Anthony Heath identifies ‘the paradox of integration’ which can lead to 
alienation from the mainstream. The paradox arises when second generation populations, 
which are more integrated by any objective measure, demonstrate greater awareness of 
unfairness than the preceding immigrant cohorts. As Nasar Meer’s contribution shows, 
British Muslims are characterised by a strong identification with Britain and by a trend towards 
greater social integration. Yet the way in which the war on terror is perceived to target Muslims 
collectively can make some constituencies open to the rhetoric of jihadi Islamism.
As Vidhya Ramalingam’s contribution documents, the British far right has changed profoundly 
in the last decade, while Dave Rich’s contribution highlights that antisemitism remains 
a disturbing force in Britain, presenting risks to the safety of UK Jews and contributing to 
feelings of insecurity. The risk of violent hate crime against Jews, including anti-Jewish terror 
attacks, remains a potent expression of a politics of intolerance and division. However, racism 
constantly mutates; classical antisemitism is just one of the many forms its takes. Some far 
right groups have attempted to re-brand themselves as superficially philosemitic. A politics of 
division has attempted to play off different forms of racism against each other in a game of 
competitive victimhood. Yet the evidence – as collected by the Community Security Trust and 
others – clearly shows that antisemitism remains a species of prejudice that connects far 
right extremism with Islamist extremism. 
The perception that migration-driven demographic change is occurring without consultation 
with the settled population can make some constituencies open to the rhetoric of far right 
movements. Yet, as Ben Rogaly and Becky Taylor argue in their contribution, the image of 
a homogenous ‘white working class’ obscures the complex migration histories of majority 
ethnic populations, as well as the common experiences and interests they share with people 
from minority backgrounds. Many in Britain’s diverse population – including both minority 
ethnic and majority ethnic citizens – face a range of disadvantages, several of which are 
shared. These disadvantages give rise to both real and imagined grievances – whether about 
the war on terror or about rapid demographic change.
The more fine-grained understanding of the social context of hate politics outlined in these 
five essays indicate that there needs to be a new approach towards combatting racism and 
extremism and promoting integration. This is considered in the final papers: Maleiha Malik, 
in her contribution, calls for a renewed commitment to a strong legal framework for tackling 
intolerance while Ben Gidley outlines the need for a re-focused social policy agenda.
Cutting across the politically diverse starting points and perspectives of these essays and 
the discussions they engendered at the symposium, a number of key themes and principles 
emerge. These highlight the need to consider the social context of contemporary forms of 
intolerance and for there to be renewed emphasis on the politics of cohesion. Formulated 
as a series of recommendations, they provide a tangible and compelling agenda for action.
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TACKLING RACISM
1.   Policy on racism, integration and cohesion must be aligned with the realities 
of disadvantage
Grievances relating to disadvantage provide fertile ground for intolerance and division. 
To combat intolerance, therefore, we need to understand and address its social contexts. 
Rather than tackle intolerance and extremism in isolation, the debate about achieving 
racial justice, social mobility and social justice must be at the heart of a renewed strategy 
for integration and cohesion.
2.   Antisemitism must be addressed alongside other forms of racism. Strategies for combating 
specific racisms should draw upon and learn from strategies for combating others
Antisemitism, Islamophobia and xenophobia are related to each other, but never 
straightforwardly. Only by working collaboratively and sharing best practice, can we 
effectively resist intolerance both across and within communities.  For example, long-
established work in the Jewish community to monitor and respond to antisemitic hate 
crime has informed innovative work to track anti-Muslim prejudice, such as the Measuring 
Anti-Muslim Attacks (MAMA) initiative, championed by Baroness Warsi. This is an area that 
parliamentarians have the opportunity and responsibility to lead.
ADDRESSING SOCIAL POLICY 
3.   There needs to be a whole-community-approach to integration
Integration is not just a duty of migrants and minorities, but of the whole of society and 
its institutions. Mainstream social policy instruments should be rigorously scrutinised to 
identify how best they can affect equal outcomes across society.  This requires guidance 
and leadership from central government.
Targeted social policy measures aimed at specific groups should continue. However, these 
must form part of the whole-community approach. A selective approach to integration, which 
only targets ‘problem’ minorities reproduces the flaws of a divisive state multiculturalism: 
stigmatising groups, driving grievances and competition, promoting division over cohesion.
4.   A national strategy for integration should be developed, along with national guidelines for 
its implementation
Government is right to see integration as something which unfolds differently in each 
locality, and MPs, rooted in constituencies with differing experiences of the process, 
are well placed to articulate local dimensions. However, locally devolved strategies are 
insufficient to build more integrated communities.  A national strategy for integration should 
set out detailed, concrete, substantive actions and a coherent methodology for measuring 
progress based on robust data: such a smart approach is the only cost-effective approach 
to doing social policy in a time of austerity.
5.   Britain’s robust body of anti-discrimination law must be maintained and strengthened
Having created world-leading mechanisms of redress, which individuals from Britain’s 
ethnic and religious minorities facing discrimination and disadvantage can access, the 
priority now for anti-discrimination law is mainstreaming the needs of minorities and 
instilling a duty on public authorities to promote cohesion. Without this whole-of-society 
approach, minority populations and individuals within them remain vulnerable to un-
regulated parallel community structures.
INTRODUCTION
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6.   There should be a renewed commitment to the Public Sector Equality Duty.
Far from being a top-down bureaucratic exercise, the equality duty mainstreams the 
needs of minorities. It provides a platform for public authorities to engage in dialogue and 
consultation with local citizens and to make transparent the ethical debates on which local 
policy-making is based.
OPENNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY
7.   All sectors of society have a duty to speak responsibly on issues around race, migrants 
and minorities
Vigilance against the ‘hard’ forms of racism that drive far right and Islamist extremism 
should be extended to include ‘soft’ forms of intolerance that are more widespread in all 
our diverse communities. The kinds of grievances which give rise to these softer forms 
of racism are often driven by inflamed discourse and debates based on perceptions and 
assertions rather than facts. To this end, community spokespeople have a responsibility to 
promote evidence-based, open discussion and debate.
8.   Politicians have the opportunity and a duty to promote a more open, balanced discussion 
on integration
Members of Parliament should seek to engage their constituencies in the debate about 
integration using language that does not alienate, but rather speaks to their concerns 
about fairness, equality and justice:
•   Take care in the use of numbers - inaccurate presentation of information leads to divisive 
debates and bad policy-making
•   Avoid terms such as ‘native population’ which can obscure the contribution and strong 
British identification of long-settled minority populations and conflate nationality with 
ethnicity
•   Avoid speaking of Britain’s diverse population as if it is composed of discrete and 
homogenous entities - ‘Muslim communities’ or ‘white working class communities’ - 
given that similarities across and differences within such communities are often at least 
as significant.  Such terms, in failing to recognise the diversity and range of voices and 
positions within such populations, also fail to address the real structures of disadvantage 
that shape their experiences
•   Reject images of ‘model’ minorities against which the integration of other populations 
is judged.
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It is commonly said that Britain has not had a debate on integration. This is a fallacy: the problem is that we have had the wrong debate, based on unstable and evidence-free 
foundations. In the field of integration, the approach in the UK has been characterised by no 
clear policies, no means of measuring progress, no engagement with those most affected, 
no direction, and no accountability. Government has yet to identify what it is willing and able 
to do for Britain’s black and minority ethnic communities. 
There is a lack of clarity around the question to which integration is the answer. Too often, policy 
makers proceed from the assumption of dis-integration: minority communities are perceived 
to be not integrated enough, and migrants are equated with ‘trouble’. These assumptions are 
based on a notion of Britishness that is frozen in time, and fails to take account of the nature 
of a modern Britain, its citizenry, or its role in the world.
Bad policy – policy based on false assumptions – creates poor outcomes. But the subsequent 
failure to make progress as a result of bad policy also generates a policy fatigue that can make 
debates even more intractable and make it yet harder to revisit the topic. Britain urgently 
needs a re-focusing of the integration debate. 
We need therefore to re-think what the genuine conditions for integration are. Of the five 
principles for integration adopted by the current government, “common ground” is an 
essential part of this approach, but it needs to be thought about in a democratic way. An 
authoritarian integration strategy stresses minority responsibilities; a democratic approach 
stresses responsibilities but also rights. People from minority ethnic backgrounds are an 
asset, not a threat, to British values and national unity. 
IF INTEGRATION IS THE ANSWER, 
WHAT WAS THE QUESTION?
ROB BERKELEY 
IF INTEGRATION IS THE ANSWER, WHAT WAS THE QUESTION?
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The Coalition Government, in stepping back from a top-down integration strategy, has started 
a debate to clarify the role of the state, but as yet we have not found the right answer.  The 
state cannot be the arbiter of British values; that is a task for the citizens of this country in all 
their ethnic diversity. 
If it is not the state’s responsibility to define common ground, this does not mean it can step 
down from ensuring a level playing field for all of Britain’s communities. Thus “localism” is a 
valuable principle; there is a clear need for local solutions. After all, not only are all politics 
local, so too are experiences of racism. But a turn to localism will be a step back if it abrogates 
central government’s responsibility for ensuring effective engagement in the country’s 
socio-economic life and central government’s responsibility in providing local agencies with 
substantive guidance on achieving and measuring progress towards racial justice. 
Combating extremism and intolerance also remains essential, and we should acknowledge 
the government’s commitment to challenging extremism and intolerance, particularly its 
focus on anti-Muslim hate crime. However, Runnymede would like to see a wider approach 
focusing on racism and discrimination facing all ethnic groups. 57% of ethnic minorities 
believe that there is racial discrimination in the UK, with 36% reporting personal experience 
of discrimination. In particular, amongst Black Caribbean people, 49% report personal 
experience of discrimination.
Similarly, participation in civic life is also essential, but full participation is impossible to 
achieve for those in our society facing the sharpest forms of disadvantage. “Participation” 
makes little sense if you worry about where your next meal is coming from. There is little 
evidence so far that mainstream platforms of civic engagement have the capacity to respond 
adequately to diversity and to include all of Britain’s communities. 
Social mobility – addressing disadvantage – is therefore the real key to creating the conditions 
for integration, but the social mobility agenda for disadvantaged minority communities has 
stalled. For some groups, patterns of labour market exclusion and educational failure are 
depressingly persistent. Even in the wake of the Lawrence convictions we still see persistent 
racial inequality and injustice in our society.
Youth unemployment among Black and Pakistani heritage young people is more than double 
the rate of that of white young people. Three times as many young Black men will start a 
prison sentence this year than will join a Russell Group university. Police waste 5,500 days 
each year stopping and searching Black and Asian people without reducing the incidence of 
crime. Government research has highlighted that if you have an identifiably African or Asian 
name you have to make nearly twice as many applications to even get an interview.
These inequalities are not solely due to racism, or any one simple factor. But racism remains 
a live issue in Britain. Runnymede research and that of others shows that concern about 
racial injustice was a key motivator in the riots of 2011. Our football terraces and fields are 
once again dealing with overt racist attitudes. We cannot start to create the conditions for 
integration without addressing these fundamental issues of justice. 
These inequalities have complex causes, and therefore need tailored and strategic 
approaches to tackle them; detailed, substantive, concrete solutions are needed. 
Mainstream agencies have a key role in delivering fairness. However, the evidence 
shows that targeted responses to racial injustice are also required, based on a 
realistic assessment of what we know about where disadvantage is concentrated and 
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on a workable method of measuring progress. This requires a comprehensive, cross-
departmental government strategy. 
To develop a coherent integration strategy, we need to acknowledge that diversity without 
equality is apartheid – but also that cohesion without respect for difference is authoritarianism. 
A re-focused integration debate would take the opportunity to further benefit from the diversity 
of the ethnic and faith backgrounds of its citizens, recognising that integration is a two-way 
process of mutual adaptation. It would fully engage the whole of civil society – but especially 
organisations with expertise in the fields of community building, race equality and migration: 
those organisations which work most closely with those most directly affected by integration 
policies. 
A coherent integration strategy, finally, would take fairness and racial justice, not assimilation, 
as its starting point. A return to assimilation is neither desirable nor practicable and puts at 
risk the benefits we have gained from the ethnic diversity of British people.
IF INTEGRATION IS THE ANSWER, WHAT WAS THE QUESTION?
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Many commentators have raised questions about the extent to which Muslims are successfully integrating into British society.  These concerns go back to the disturbances 
in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001.  Doubts were expressed then, and later, about the 
extent to which Muslim groups in those cities lived ‘parallel lives’, remaining in homogenous 
neighbourhoods, apart from the British mainstream, and therefore failing to mix with British 
citizens and failing to adapt to British values.  According to this account, Muslims have failed 
to integrate either socially or culturally.
Coming at these issues from a completely different angle, other commentators have noted the 
rise of Islamophobia and the extent to which Muslims suffer various forms of exclusion and 
rejection by British society, resulting in high unemployment rates and economic disadvantage. 
In this account, Muslims have indeed not managed to integrate structurally, but this has been 
more a result of exclusion and discrimination by the white British majority rather than lack 
of willingness to integrate.  Various writers have, for example, shown that there are ‘Muslim 
penalties’ in the labour market, and there is also a good deal of evidence of anti-Muslim 
sentiments.
These two arguments could of course be related empirically: exclusion and discrimination 
might well lead to feelings of being unwanted, which in turn might lead to a reluctance to 
integrate.  Sociologists have developed the concept of ‘reactive ethnicity’ to express the 
idea that prejudice and discrimination might lead minorities to emphasize their ethnic 
distinctiveness as a reaction against their exclusion from mainstream society.  The same 
idea could apply in the religious field too.  David Voas and Fenella Fleischmann have asked 
“What happens to the religious identity, belief and practice of Muslims who settle in Western 





secular?  Or do they react against the dominant ethos and perceived prejudice by becoming 
more religious?” 1 
Our thesis is that there are elements in both accounts for which there is an empirical base 
but that a deeper understanding of Muslim integration and disadvantage needs to take into 
account processes of generational change of the kind alluded to by Voas and Fleischmann. 
Some Muslims have only recently arrived in Britain, perhaps as refugees from civil wars in 
Somalia or the Middle East, while others born and brought up in Britain, have acquired British 
citizenship and think of Britain as their home.  It would not be surprising if recent arrivals did 
not speak English and tended to draw their friends and social circle from co-ethnics and co-
religionists, and did not yet identify with Britain.  The key question is what happens in the second 
generation, among people who have been born and brought up in Britain.  Does the second 
generation reject British society and British values? 
As we shall see below, the empirical evidence generally tells us a very positive story of generational 
progress and increasing social integration.  However, we believe that there may also be a ‘paradox 
of integration’.  While recent arrivals may indeed be oriented to their country of origin, and have 
frames of reference that owe more to their lives in Somalia or the Middle East or South Asia, British-
born young Muslims will have British frames of reference, and will expect to be treated in similar 
ways to their British peers.  They will share British values such as equality of opportunity, and will 
expect to experience equal treatment themselves.  The more socially and culturally integrated they 
are, the more they will be aware of these values, and the more they will be aware of infractions 
of those values and of unequal treatment.  Awareness of discrimination and resulting discontent 
with British society may therefore actually be larger among the British-born and among those who 
are more integrated.
Before providing the evidence for these arguments, we need to remind ourselves about the 
composition of the Muslim population of Britain.  The 2011 census shows that Muslims were 
Britain’s second-largest religious group with 2.7 million members (4.8 percent of the population) 
in England and Wales.  They are also the most ethnically-diverse religious group: while the 
largest component consists of Muslims with Pakistani backgrounds, there are also substantial 
numbers of Muslims with other South Asian, African and Middle Eastern backgrounds, together 
with white converts.  1.2 million of the Muslim population were actually born in Britain and can 
therefore be regarded as belonging to the ‘second generation’.
We can use the data from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (EMBES) to explore 
generational change in Muslim cultural and structural integration into British society, their 
perceptions of rejection and discrimination, and the extent of ‘reactive religiosity’.  We focus 
on the main Muslim ethnic groups (ie excluding the white groups on whom we have little data), 
that is on people whose own or family origins were in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Africa and 
the Caribbean.
In table 1 we show the patterns of generational change in various indicators of social, cultural 
and structural integration.  We distinguish between the first generation, who migrated to Britain 
as adults and who would therefore have grown up in their country of origin.  Next we have what is 
termed the 1.5 generation who were born abroad but came to Britain before reaching adulthood 
(which we define for these purposes as age 16) and who will therefore have had some experience 
of British education.  Finally there is the second generation who were born in Britain and have 
grown up in Britain themselves.  (There will also now be a small but growing third-generation 
population, whom we have included with the second generation.)
MUSLIM INTEGRATION AND DISADVANTAGE
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Significance of the 
generational change
% fluent in English 43 82 98 P < 0.001
% British citizens 72 95 100 P < 0.001
% expressing British or 
English national identity
66 86 94 P < 0.001
% feeling fair amount 
in common with 
British people
75 94 89 P < 0.001
% bothered a lot if 
close relative married 
a white person
23 17 11 P < 0.001
% with low qualifications 48 29 14 P < 0.001
% economically 
inactive (women)
57 47 28 P < 0.001
% unemployed (men) 12 9 11 P > 0.05
Source: EMBES 2010, weighted data.
Table 1 shows very clear evidence of increasing cultural and social integration.  The biggest change 
is in the use and fluency of English: by the second generation almost everyone is either fluent in 
English or uses English as their first language.  We also see big increases in British citizenship and 
British identity and reduced social distance from white British people.  All of these changes are 
highly significant.2 
There are also clear signs of structural integration, most notably in education where the 1.5 and 
second generations have taken full advantage of the educational opportunities available to them. 
In other research we have also found that the large gender gap in education which characterized 
Muslims brought up in South Asian countries has completely disappeared among the second-
generation, who have fully assimilated to the British pattern where girls fare rather better than 
boys educationally.  There is also very clear evidence of a major increase in the economic activity 
of second-generation Muslim women, compared with their mothers’ generation.  However, while 
in all these respects we have clear evidence of generational convergence with mainstream British 
patterns, we also have to note that Muslim unemployment rates among men remain stubbornly 
high, around double those of the white British.  This contrasts sharply with the generational progress 
in education, and is strongly suggestive that processes of labour market exclusion adversely affect 
second-generation Muslims.
Field experiments have demonstrated that there is continuing discrimination against people of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi background who have British qualifications.3 To be sure we do not 
have any specific studies of the discrimination experienced by second-generation Muslims, but 
the evidence on people of Pakistani background, coupled with recent statistical analysis of the 
‘religious penalties’ experienced by Muslims in the labour market, is fairly powerful evidence that 
discrimination against British-born Muslims is still occurring.
We also have clear evidence that the British-born Muslims are more aware of discrimination 
and exclusion than are earlier generations.  We can see this clearly in table 2.
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TABLE 2. INCREASING PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE SECOND GENERATION
1st generation 1.5 generation 2nd generation Significance of 
the generational 
change




8 17 20 P < 0.001
% feeling things 
have got worse 
for Muslims
32 47 58 P < 0.001
% feeling there 
is prejudice 
against Muslims
27 34 46 P < 0.001
Source: EMBES 2010, weighted data.
So, despite being unequivocally more integrated socially and culturally in the second 
generation, Muslim perceptions of discrimination and exclusion are much increased.  We 
must emphasize that we are not suggesting that actual discrimination against the second 
generation is greater than against the first generation – we do not have the field studies to 
show whether or not this is the case, and the statistical analyses of religious penalties in 
the labour market that we have conducted imply that discrimination has been constant, not 
increasing, across generations.  The key point, which we term the paradox of integration, is 
that as Muslims become more integrated into British society, speaking English, acquiring 
citizenship and thinking of Britain as home, so they become more aware of and sensitive to 
the inequalities of opportunity facing them in British society.
Has this led to ‘reactive religiosity’?  Table 3 shows convincing evidence that the second 
generation maintain high levels of religious identity and practice (much higher it should be 
noted than British-born Christians).  We do not see evidence of major movements in the 
direction of secularization, but nor is there evidence of ‘reactive religiosity’.  Possibly the 
increased awareness of exclusion in the second generation has cancelled out the movements 
towards secularization that might otherwise have occurred, but we cannot be sure of this.
TABLE 3:  ABSENCE OF MAJOR GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR PRACTICE
1st generation 1.5 generation 2nd generation
%  religion very important 94 96 92 P > 0.05
% who identify as Muslim 
rather or more than British
51 52 48 P > 0.05
% belonging to an ethnic or 
religious organisation
78 65 72 P > 0.01
%  regularly attending 
mosque once a week 
58 52 53 P > 0.05
Source: EMBES 2010, weighted data.
MUSLIM INTEGRATION AND DISADVANTAGE
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In conclusion, the empirical evidence shows that simple caricatures of Muslims as leading 
separate lives will not do.  In many important respects the evidence of increasing integration 
across the generations is undeniable and the progress itself is dramatic.   In the public sphere, 
British-born Muslims are overall well-integrated.  In the private sphere of religious identity and 
practice, they have maintained their distinctiveness.  But for policy-makers the challenge is 
to address the increasing awareness of discrimination and exclusion.  Integration is a two-
way process, and non-Muslim British citizens must do their part too to live up to the ideal of 
providing equality of opportunity for their Muslim fellow-citizens
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The current economic, financial and policy climate has expanded disadvantage in the UK creating greater precariousness at work and drastic cuts to welfare benefits and public 
services. For some analysts, the success of UKIP in council elections in spring 2013 was 
generated by this climate. Yet UKIP’s narrative does not encourage a united approach to 
tackling disadvantage. Rather it helps to reproduce a longer established public discourse 
of divide and rule; one that seeks to separate out ‘strivers’ from ‘skivers’ to justify cuts in 
benefits, and immigrants and ethnic minorities from the so-called indigenous population in 
defining who belongs to the UK’s constituent nations. 
The category ‘white working class’ has been deployed widely in this debate, but in two ways: 
pejoratively by some commentators to equate to ‘chavs’ or poor whites living in council 
estates, and by others as ‘beleaguered natives’ suffering in the face of high immigration, 
ethnic diversity and unassimilated radical Islam. Both of these uses of the ‘white working 
class’ acknowledge its disadvantage while portraying it as fundamentally separate from 
both settled ethnic minority working-class people and migrant workers. Both also figure the 
‘white working class’ as fixed in place rather than mobile, and prioritise issues of identity over 
inequality. 
Such approaches contain ahistorical, taken-for-granted and unchanging ways of thinking 
about working classness and ethnic identity. And yet history is repeatedly mobilised in the 
support of these notions of the ‘white working class’. Put crudely, the narrative goes something 
like this: the white working class – often condensed into the iconic and plucky East Enders of 
the Blitz – endured the war, and earned their place in society and the post-war welfare state. 
Newcomers, whether 1950s New Commonwealth migrants or later arrivals, did not – and are 
therefore seen as undeserving of the same level of benefits. 
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It is not only populist media and politicians that portray the East End as divided between 
true ‘cockney’, i.e. undifferentiated white, East Enders, and ‘strangers from the Third World’. 
Perhaps most high profile among recent academic contributions has been Dench, Gavron 
and Young’s The New East End: kinship, race and conflict (2006).1 This discussed relations 
among working-class people in the East End (white people and people with Bangladeshi 
heritage) and relations between working class and recently arrived middle-class residents 
(mostly white). Yet, throughout, Bangladeshi residents were not ascribed any class, while 
despite the long history of Jewish, Irish and other immigration to the East End, the diverse 
ethnic heritages of ‘white’ residents remained underplayed.
Attaching ethnicity to class as in the term ‘white working class’ thus hides more than it  reveals. 
It also detracts from understanding the common experiences of disadvantage. While it has 
been successfully used to mobilise political outrage, often in the form of xenophobia, the term 
obstructs attempts to address material inequalities. What we argue for instead is a nuanced 
approach, one which demands attention to both time and place in any discussions of the 
working class, white or otherwise. Fifty years after E. P. Thompson published The Making of 
the English Working Class, who the working class of Britain is today, and how its members 
might be located within (their own) migration histories, needs to be better understood.2
In the remainder of this essay, we bring key insights from the disciplines of geography and 
history to unsettle assumptions made about the ‘white working class’ in the policy and media 
debate. Even cursory engagement with recent historical and geographical thinking disrupts 
an uncritical acceptance of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ approach. Geographer Doreen Massey has 
drawn attention to the ways the places where people live are ‘always already connected to 
elsewhere, constructed out of… trading connections, the unequal links of colonialism, thoughts 
of home.’3  For Massey, recognition that displacement happens both ‘through migration (or the 
geographical movement of others)’, and through experiencing dispossession while ‘staying 
still’ has the potential to ‘bring people together in common anger’.4
Rogaly’s current research5 explores these themes in the seemingly quiet provincial city of 
Peterborough which was not only host to recent political announcements setting out tougher 
Labour immigration policies, but was also a chosen rally location for the English Defence 
League.6 He explores the mobility and fixity of working-class people from all backgrounds. 
Building on the understanding that the largest contemporary flow of migrants to Peterborough 
since the Second World War has been composed of white British people (many of them 
‘overspill’ Londoners), his work explicitly considers the recent migration histories of ethnic 
majority people who moved to the city from elsewhere in the country as well as of settled 
ethnic minorities and recent international migrants. The resulting oral histories also reveal a 
close connection between Peterborough and its rural hinterland. 
Many who work in Peterborough’s nearby rural areas – in food production, processing and 
distribution – reside in the city, and many of its white British residents moved there from the 
surrounding countryside. They, like other incomers, contribute to on-going change in the city, 
and react to it:
Gill was born in Oundle in 1927. She moved to Peterborough as an infant. Leaving school at 14 
during the war, she worked first at a corset factory and later for a Dutch bulb and flowers firm. 
Her remaining family live in the United States, and while she doesn’t conceive of her relatives 
as migrants, she reflected on her own ambivalence towards moving: ‘I like it out there but I 
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don’t know why I don’t want to live out there, because I could go as easy as that, but England’s 
my home’. Yet at home Gill is perturbed by her experience of the changed city around her: ‘I 
remember the happy days… [But] we go down town now and there’s nobody saying ‘Hello, 
how are you?’ And it’s all foreign languages. You don’t know if you’re in Peterborough or not. 
It’s changed so much it really has…
Joanna, another white British Peterborough resident, was born in 1955 and grew up in a 
village between Kings Lynn and Wisbech. On leaving school she worked first in a continental 
quilt factory in Wisbech before moving to Peterborough in the late-1970s to marry a man 
from the city. Her changing experience of Peterborough was the opposite of Gill’s: ‘I hated 
Peterborough when I first came because I thought everyone was so unfriendly… I didn’t like it 
at all.’ Might this have been because she was arriving at the same time as tens of thousands 
of other white British incomers, all be it that many of the latter came from further away? 
Joanna’s take on Peterborough shifted dramatically after an abandoned attempt to settle 
back in Wisbech: ‘I was coming back to Peterborough… I needed to be able to go to the 
theatre. I needed to be able to go to the cinema… [Wisbech] was boring and people were 
just odd, they weren’t very friendly. And I always thought that they were friendly when I was 
young… But actually perhaps they weren’t. I don’t know.’
Both these stories contain ambivalence, movement, fixity, and changing meanings of place 
over historical time and an individual’s life course. Gill and Joanna, both from white British 
working-class backgrounds, experienced the same city in different ways. This in turn was 
related to how they felt about other places they had moved between in the past and present. 
In Gill’s case in particular her negative feelings about contemporary Peterborough related 
to other people’s arrival in the city, particularly the arrival of international migrants and their 
descendants.
While these case studies use geography and oral history to bring into question the nativeness 
of people constructed as ‘white working class’, it is also important to consider the working 
class-ness of people who are constructed as migrants. Just as some stories broke down 
preconceived ideas of a pristine white rurality, others revealed a continuity in exploitive 
agricultural working and housing practices which leading Labour politicians have recently 
associated with the post-2004 arrival of Central and Eastern Europeans.7  Even these brief 
glimpses from Peterborough give a sense of the complicated relationship between identity, 
place and time: we cannot presume to read off from an individual’s appearance either their 
migration history or feelings of affiliation and belonging. Geographically we need to attend to 
internal moves as much as international ones and to challenge constructions of indigeneity and 
whiteness on which far-right organising, as well as much mainstream political assumptions, 
are often based. History, and in this case oral history, reveals continuities as well as change 
in working-class mobilities and fixities over time. These insights should lead political leaders 
and national media figures to be more cautious about contributing, even inadvertently, to 
the stigmatisation of international migrants, both through what they say and where they say 
it. They might also encourage politicians to be bolder in articulating the structures which 
give rise to common experiences of inequality and disadvantage, rather than focussing on 
external markers of difference.
1 Geoff Dench, Kate Gavron and Michael Young, The New East End: Kinship, Race and Conflict 
(London, 2006).
2 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, 1963).
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3 Doreen Massey,  ‘Places and their pasts’, History Workshop Journal 39 (1995), 183.
4 Doreen Massey, ‘Landscape/space/politics: an essay’, http://thefutureoflandscape.wordpress.com/
landscapespacepolitics-an-essay/ (accessed 24 September 2013).
5 See: http://www.placesforall.co.uk (accessed 17 October 2013).
6 Ben Rogaly and Kaveri Qureshi, ‘Diversity, urban space and the right to the provincial city’, Identities: 
Global Studies in Culture and Power, 20/4 (2013), 423-37.
7 A point Rogaly and Qureshi developed in an invited talk at the Peterborough Racial Equality 
Council in June 2012. See: http://placesforall.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/Theme-work-PDF-
moocow-12-3-13.pdf (accessed 24th September 2013).
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Britain’s far right has historically been characterised by failure and marginality. It has been less well organised and less successful electorally than similar organisations across 
Europe. There is broad consensus among researchers that the failures of the far right owe 
much to the agency of parties and movements themselves (i.e. due to failures of leadership, 
strategy, and ability to maintain unity). However, despite these struggles, Britain’s far right has 
been surprisingly resilient. This is largely because of the wide reservoir of tacit support for far 
right ideas. The UK has historically been fertile ground for movements thriving on discontent 
with mainstream political institutions, popular xenophobia, and euro-scepticism. Since the 
1960s, large majorities of the British population have been opposed to immigration, and 
research from the Migration Observatory has noted that over the past 15 years immigration 
has become one of the most salient issues in Britain.1 Thus, the demand for the far right has 
always been there – and in this sense, the extent of the ‘problem’ in Britain is bigger than the 
success of these parties might suggest. 
KEY MOVEMENTS AND DEFINING FEATURES
The far right scene in Britain has been defined by several different actors, both parliamentary 
and extra-parliamentary in nature. The parliamentary groups include the National Front 
(which reached its peak in the 1970s) and the more persistent British National Party (BNP). 
Despite the local successes of the BNP over the years in places like Burnley, Dudley, and the 
London borough of Barking and Dagenham, as well as the two European Parliament seats 
they acquired in 2009, the party has today largely collapsed and will likely bear little weight 
on British politics in the coming years. 
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In the wake of the BNP’s failure to effectively harness the fertile environment for far right politics, a 
new form of extra-parliamentary far right extremism has emerged, employing new methods and a 
new approach to social change. The English Defence League (EDL) emerged in Luton in the spring 
of 2009 from a series of loosely defined movements that drew on football hooligan networks for 
support, and today claims to ‘peacefully protest against Islamic extremism.’ The EDL has tended to 
operate outside of the political system, deploying mass mobilisation or the threat of mobilisation, as 
its major means of influence. Ranging from lower-level violence to professedly ‘peaceful’ marches 
and protests, these activities serve to polarise communities and generate fear and tension, often 
resulting in ‘copy-cat’ threats or violence, even from counter-movements. In addition, the far right 
scene hosts an array of alternative and often short-lived organisations ranging from political and 
non-violent groups like British Freedom and the English Democrats to violent groups like Combat 18.
Though the UK Independence Party (UKIP), a Eurosceptic and populist party which surged 
in the 2013 local elections, is not a right-wing extremist party, there are considerable 
overlaps between its policy proposals and those of the far right: for example it calls to end 
‘uncontrolled immigration’, the removal of benefits for immigrants, and even calls from some 
party representatives to deport Muslims.2 There is also evidence of overlaps in the support 
base; UKIP supporters and leaders have attitudes that have typically been associated with 
the BNP.3 Therefore, in order to paint a comprehensive picture of what drives support for the 
far right, this paper also draws from knowledge about UKIP supporters.
Over the last two decades, considerable research has been done to uncover key characteristics 
of far right supporters in Britain. The evidence suggests the following characteristics of far 
right support:
•  The far right has actually struggled to galvanise support of young people since the heydays 
of the National Front. From the BNP to the EDL, these are male dominated, ageing groups, 
often attracting middle-aged or elderly working-class men. 
•  It has never been the poorest in society that support the far right; BNP voters tend to be 
spread evenly across skilled workers, unskilled workers, and those dependent on state 
benefits. Many far right supporters are in full-time employment.4  
•  There is a higher capacity for violence among supporters of far right movements. While 
these movements are not openly violent, they have tended to attract citizens who are more 
likely than average to either engage in violence, or perceive violence as justifiable.5 
•  There is a varying intensity of attitudes from radical to the extreme within the far right. 
Recent research shows that BNP and UKIP voters are driven by a similar set of concerns. 
However BNP supporters are more hostile towards immigrants, and more likely to believe 
that certain racial groups are superior to others.6
•  There are connections between the radical and extreme, both personal and institutional, as well 
as overlaps in support base. The BNP is the preferred voting party of EDL supporters, despite 
the fact that the EDL publicly rejects the BNP. The EDL has professed support for UKIP, despite 
the fact that UKIP denies any relationship and denounces this affiliation. 
•  Finally, it is important to note that individuals in these movements often appear to be 
‘normal people, socially integrated, connected in one way or another to mainstream 
groups and ideas’.7 It is therefore important not to stereotype these groups, or their 
assumed support base, such as the white working class.
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DRIVERS OF FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISM: 
PERCEPTIONS OF CONFLICT, ISLAMOPHOBIA, AND MISTRUST
Life history interviews with far right supporters in Britain reveal that the core motive for joining 
right wing movements is often growing perceptions of cultural conflict, that diversity and migration 
threaten native groups. Joel Busher from the University of Huddersfield notes that EDL supporters 
also ‘have a strong enough attachment to their ‘way of life’ to make this cause salient.’8 Though 
this anxiety is often enhanced by media and hear-say about migrant abuse of the system and 
other scandals, in some cases it can be motivated by a personal experience (e.g. bullying or child 
abuse). Indeed even personal experiences of racism can shape one’s journey into a racist group.
Islamophobia has become one of the strongest drivers of far-right extremism, particularly in a 
post 9/11 climate. Large majorities of BNP (85%) and UKIP (87%) supporters are convinced 
that Islam poses a serious danger to the West. Similarly, 64% of UKIP supporters would feel 
“bothered a lot” by the presence of an Islamic institution in their community, which is over 
twice the national average (31%). 9 However, it is important to note that these attitudes are 
not confined to the far right. In a recent survey, 37% of voters would be more likely to support 
a party that promised to reduce the numbers of Muslims in the country.10  
There is however a generational divide in cultural anxiety and Islamophobia. The BNP and 
UKIP are failing to connect with young people, with only a minority of supporters in the two 
organisations younger than 36 years old. Even EDL supporters tend to be middle-aged or 
elderly, with most sympathisers over the age of 44 and more likely than average to be retired.11 
Recent surveys confirm that those over age of 60 are more likely to endorse ideas that we 
should reduce Muslims in country, or that Islam poses a danger to Western civilisation, while 
18 – 24 year olds are far more at ease with role of Muslims in Britain.12  
There is some evidence of geographical correlations for cultural anxiety and Islamophobia; 
some research suggests that far right support is concentrated in areas with large Muslim 
communities,13 and others claim that it is highest in areas with high levels of residential 
segregation, suggesting that a lack of interaction and contact between different communities 
may be an important factor.14 Interestingly the presence of non-Muslim Asians has been 
shown to have no significant effect on far right support, and BNP support has actually been 
lower in areas with larger black populations.15 
Finally, far right supporters are more distrustful than average of mainstream politicians and of 
public institutions. Demos’ survey of EDL supporters online notes that 88% of EDL supporters 
‘tend not to trust’ the government, compared to a similarly high 68% national average.16 
Mistrust of the police is even more pronounced. Distrust is not confined to the margins; a recent 
YouGov survey shows that 66% of the public would be more likely to support a political party 
that ‘pledged to stand up to political and business elites’.17 
WHAT SUSTAINS COMMITMENT WITHIN THE FAR RIGHT?
Far right commitment is driven by a combination of conviction and protest, but it must not 
be assumed that it is entirely one or the other. Though it is tempting to believe that the far 
right groups grow because of their protest narrative rather than intrinsic racism or extremist 
ideologies, it is important to remember that data from both the UK and Europe suggests that 
people are strongly motivated by far right ideologies and the politics these groups offer.
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It is also important to note the rewarding elements of membership in the far right. Research 
by Joel Busher notes that for the EDL, the feeling of collective acts of protest brings feelings of 
empowerment, of ‘doing something,’ or ‘making a stand’, and fighting for your community.18 
Given that far right supporters are known to have particularly high levels of pessimism 
regarding their futures, this is an important draw.
There are reasons to be wary about the potential impact of stigmatisation in sustaining 
membership in the far right. There is some evidence to show that activist’s ideas often 
develop and intensify after they enter the movement.19 Thus, it is critical to think about how 
the ways we confront the far right could impact those within it – could we inadvertently be 
further radicalising a group by censoring it? Further research is required to better understand 
whether low trust in inter-group relations and the political establishment pushes individuals 
into the far right, or whether these attitudes are a product of membership in the far right, and 
experiences of stigmatisation from wider society. The process of stigmatisation may reinforce 
these groups’ hostility towards the mainstream.
WHAT BREAKS COMMITMENT WITHIN THE FAR RIGHT?
The recent exit of the EDL’s leader, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, from the group also raises 
questions about what drives individuals to disengage from far right movements. First, it 
sheds light on the internal struggles within far right movements, which often attract a mix of 
supporters with divergent agendas, ranging from concerned citizens of white working-class 
background to neo-Nazi and skinhead followings. This diversity can cause movements to 
fragment and split, in some cases spawning more radical splinter groups like the ‘Infidels’ 
and Combined Ex-Forces, and in other cases simply causing more ‘moderate’ individuals 
to leave. 
Second, it highlights an important distinction between de-radicalisation, which seeks to 
change a person’s views, and disengagement, which aims to alter their behaviour. Yaxley-
Lennon’s resignation is a welcome act of disengagement, and it remains to be seen whether 
his ideas and views change. Considering the scale of the problem, there is a relatively small 
number of practitioners carrying out interventions in the disengagement and de-radicalisation 
field, supporting individuals leaving far-right extremist movements and ideologies. Their 
experiences and the personal testimonies of former far-right extremists tell us that the de-
radicalisation process requires time. 
Finally, we need to set our sights on what the disengagement of the EDL’s leader means for 
the future of the far right in Britain. It remains to be seen what impact the resignation will 
have on the EDL itself; the movement’s unique regional structure, prolific online activity and 
social network mean that it will not disappear overnight. However, the EDL has been on the 
decline for the past year, fraught with leadership crises and internal disputes, and has seen 
a massive drop in numbers of activists willing to turn up on the streets for demonstrations. 
The movement is likely to fragment further, with some individuals following Yaxley-Lennon in 
his new pursuits or simply losing interest, and smaller, more extreme factions continuing to 
rally under the EDL brand or breaking away. The fragmentation of the EDL could pose new 
threats to community safety and national security, as multiple splinter groups departing from 
the EDL’s tactics could become more challenging for law enforcement to monitor, and could 
potentially be more violent.
The problem of tangential violence associated with far-right groups has existed for decades. 
Members or loose affiliates of these movements have been arrested and convicted of 
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attempted or actual acts of violence and terrorism. The startling numbers of hate crime 
recorded against Muslims in the UK raises questions about the possibility of sustained violent 
campaigns by far-right cells or individuals against Muslims, such as the terror campaign 
carried out by convicted Ukrainian terrorist Pavlo Lapshyn in the Midlands in 2013.
The main challenge now will be to identify what can be done to stem individual recruitment to 
‘hard’ far right support, and how this can be managed without further intensifying individuals’ 
beliefs. Secondly, there is need for more creativity in tackling the wider reservoir of ‘soft’ 
public sympathy for the far right agenda, beyond simply reinforcing social norms against 
racism and extremism. Finally, there is a need for greater emphasis on how to nurture and 
support tolerance and understanding of cultural difference among younger generations, to 
ensure that the trend of generational decline in prejudice continues.
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Over the last decade or so, and across a variety of policy domains, ‘integration’ and ‘extremism’ have been two of the most pressing and – on occasion – divisive topics. 
Sometimes conflated with each other (or at least conjoined), ‘integration’ and ‘extremism’ 
have both given rise to public policies that have not infrequently focused on Britain’s Muslims. 
TOUCHSTONES FOR ASSESSING MUSLIM INTEGRATION
‘Integration is a concept both dazzling and treacherous’, insist Saggar and Sommerville, such 
that ‘policy makers must use and define it with care’.1 It is a warning that is rarely heeded 
even though it describes a concept with a long history. For a concern with integration is as 
old as the earliest social scientific accounts of modernity; in so far it goes to the heart of how 
we understand the kinds of social relations that characterize modern societies. This dynamic 
has been recast in thinking about the integration of minority diversity – something that 
‘can neither be wished out of existence nor suppressed without an unacceptable degree of 
coercion, and often not even then’.2 A large part of European history reflects the implications of 
coming to terms with this through cycles of migration and patterns of settlement, whereupon 
the intermingling of diverse cultural, religious and ethnic groups renews and/or un-settles 
established social and political configurations. Here integration starts to become a normative 
debate that describes not only processes of change that occur amongst groups, but what a 
principled position on that change should resemble.
If we turn away from the theoretical accounts toward applied analyes of Muslim integration 
we find, as Castles and others point out, that ‘the very broadness of the integration process 





sector of society’ and ‘involves a wide range of social players’.3 This has obvious implications for 
agreeing what indicators are best suited to measure success and failure. Integration as a policy 
objective therefore needs to take a number of interdependent spheres into account. I take one 
behavioural indicator (residential settlement) and one attitudinal indicator (identity), to spotlight 
some important patterns in understanding Muslim integration in Britain.  
Residential settlement has commonly been identified as a source of visible resistance to social 
mixing; the view has been that Muslims tend to cluster and develop very strong ‘bonding capital’ 
(with kith and kin) at the expense of ‘bridging capital’ (with other groups and communities). 
The 2011 census tells us that 4.8 per cent of the population self-defines as Muslim (over 2.7 
million), and it is true that a considerable percentage of British Muslims are concentrated in 
certain local authorities in East London, the North West, Birmingham and West Yorkshire (as 
well as in areas that border these wards). But it does not follow that this clustering is tightly 
configured and nor does it mean that the pattern is fixed.  Indeed, according to an analysis of 
demographic distribution using the Index of Similarity which measures concentration, the broad 
tendency is for Muslims to be less separated than other religious groups and more likely to 
display a pattern of dispersal (e.g., settlement away from family of origin). As Jivraj outlines: ‘the 
Muslim population is relatively evenly spread through England and Wales (Index of Similarity of 
54%), which means that the separation factor has decreased since 2001’.4 As a comparison, 
the current Index of Similarity for British Hindus is 52%, British Sikhs 61% and British Jews 
63%, respectively.  This behavioural tendency is further supported by polling on the kinds of 
neighbourhoods Muslims would ideally choose to live in.  For example, when asked ‘If you 
could live in any neighbourhood in this country, which comes closest to describing the one you 
would prefer?’, Muslims are nearly 10% more likely (than non-Muslims) to want to live in ‘Mixed’ 
neighbourhoods (Muslims and non-Muslims) and half as likely to want to live in exclusively 
Muslim neighbourhoods (than other groups who would like to live in neighbourhoods exclusively 
reflecting their ethnic or religious groups).5 
Indeed, if we move to a further attitudinal indicator concerning self-identification with Britain, 
we find that Muslims are in some respects highly integrated.  This is supported by Heath and 
Roberts who, in their analyses of the UK Government’s Citizenship survey, report:  ‘We find no 
evidence that Muslims or people of Pakistani heritage were in general less attached to Britain 
than were other religions or ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities show clear evidence of ‘dual’ rather 
than ‘exclusive’ identities.’6 These authors point instead to hyphenated identities, in showing 
that 43% of Muslims belong ‘very strongly’ to Britain and 42% say that they belong to Britain 
‘fairly strongly’. Taken together these figures are higher for Muslim respondents than they 
are for Christians or those of ‘no religion’. What is especially interesting is that this confident 
British Muslim identity has developed alongside pan-Muslim solidarities, the idea of the Muslim 
‘ummah’ or ‘community of believers’. The evidence suggests that ‘Muslim trans-nationalism 
should not be treated as a post- or near- 9/11 phenomenon, but rather as a space and set of 
practices that have evolved over decades’.7 This has proved quite consistent with the widely 
accepted body of findings, recently reiterated by Wind-Cowie and Greogory’s conclusion, that 
‘overall British Muslims are more likely to be both patriotic and optimistic about Britain than are 
the white British community.’8   
These are important multiculturalist advances, yet the problem with measuring Muslim 
integration is that it quickly becomes a ‘vortex’ issue that sucks in range of others.9 One of these 
is of course ‘extremism’ to which we now turn.
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EXTREMISM AND TACIT SUPPORT
Following the 7/7 and several aborted bombings in a similar ‘leaderless Jihad’,10 the 
Labour government developed its Preventing Violent Extremism strategy.11 Pursued by the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Prevent identified five strands 
to address the causes of extremisms:
1. Undermine extremist ideology and support mainstream voices
2. Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and strengthen vulnerable institutions
3.  Support individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism
4. Increase the capacity of communities to challenge and resist violent extremism;
5. Address the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.
Both the previous and present governments have sought to advance these objectives 
through a variety of local community partnerships and across statutory bodies, as well as 
voluntary agencies and community groups ‘with police forces, local authorities and their 
partners working closely together to oversee and deliver the project’.12  So while Prevent 
included security-related work, it was also meant to build capacity in Muslim communities, to 
take a hearts and minds approach that would engender resilience against extremist politics 
amongst those deemed susceptible to recruitment into that milieu.13 Of particular concern 
was the possible exploitation of what Saggar calls the ‘politically unmentionables’.14 Quoting 
the 2007 Commonwealth Secretariat report, published in the aftermath of the Iraq War, 
these unmentionables rotated around a feeling of double standards in the West’s treatment 
of Muslim countries, and especially anger at the on-going plight of the Palestinians. The 
feeling that Britain was ‘indifferent to Muslim feelings of hurt, humiliation and dishonor’ 
was not squarely engaged with in Prevent, however, despite its stated intention.15 Prevent 
became more broadly criticized for a variety of reasons, ‘ranging from targeting the wrong 
people to stigmatizing Muslim communities by treating them all as potential terrorists’.16 
Two recurring issues were that, firstly, intelligence agencies were using the softer cohesion 
aspects of Prevent ‘to spy and illicitly collect intelligence, which has dramatically harmed 
the programme as a whole’.17 Secondly, that Prevent was oriented to address wider social 
policy within Muslim communities, which implied that this policy was only valuable because 
it contributes to counter-terrorism (something illustrated by the fact that Prevent funding was 
directly linked to the size of the Muslim population in a local authority, not on the basis of 
known risk).  
The securitization of British Muslims through that approach has contracted the spaces in 
which a dissenting citizenship can be exercised. Despite evidence that Britain’s Muslims 
are integrated according to conventional measures (more so than some ‘model minorities’), 
Muslim empathy for those deemed radical, and indeed Muslim trans-nationalism more 
broadly, has come to be seen through a counter-terrorism lens. In these conditions the risk is 
that Muslim active- citizenship becomes framed purely within a security agenda and Muslim 
communities become the ‘locus of the issue of extremism’.18 
For example, throughout the time of the Prevent program, opinion polling was interpreted 
as showing evidence of ‘tacit support’ for extremism amongst British Muslims.19 Typical 
examples included the finding in a 2007 Gallup poll that 5-10% of those polled accepted 
that violence is justified in aid of a ‘noble cause’ (something that was within the range of the 
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general public, with Muslims at least as likely to reject violence, even for a ‘noble cause’). In 
a 2005 YouGov poll, 24% ‘expressed sympathy’ with the feelings and motives of the London 
bombers, and over half – 56% – ‘could understand’ (whether or not they sympathised with 
the bombers). Further, a 2006 ICM poll found 20% had ‘some sympathy with the feelings and 
motives’ of the London bombers. The question for us is how to understand this in order to 
address it. Saggar puts the task in the following terms: ‘It is a moot point whether the job of 
penetrating the circle of tacit support is aided or deflected by further and finer interpretations 
placed on such findings. It may be that such results show that Western Muslims are aware 
that they are caught on the horns of a dilemma; or that they are reflections on the perpetual 
human condition that is drawn to sympathy for kith and kin, however misguided others may 
see this.’20 Is it then through this empathy that extremism is engendered? ‘Yes’ is the view the 
view we find in The Islamist, the highly influential account by the self-professed ‘former radical’ 
Ed Husain, who went on to create the Quilliam Foundation.21  In his memoir of a time spent 
in various burgeoning and politically active Muslim groupings in London during the 1990s, 
Husain recounts a journey through a number of Islamist organisations that overlapped with or 
operated among East London’s Bangladeshi communities, but which also held transnational 
ambitions. These included the East London Mosque, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Young Muslims 
Organisation (YMO) and the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), among others. While it is true that 
the search for identity at moments of crisis has often gone hand in hand with lack of religious 
literacy as two characteristics of those drawn to extremist groups, this does not mean that 
people drawn to these groups remain embedded within them over a life course. Not only does 
Husain’s own rejection of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) illustrate this, but also Hamid’s ethnographic 
work with ex-members reports that:
Many young people … credit HT for awakening their religio-political consciousness. HT appeals 
to a section among young people frustrated with what they see as the inaction of traditional 
authority in their communities and ineffectiveness of other Islamic groups. […] Joining HT 
seems, for most, to be a phase young people go through while at college or university. As they 
grow older, ex-members either join more moderate groups, withdraw from the activist scene 
or in some cases join groups that are influenced by HT (emphasis added).22
The implication being that a more fruitful means of engaging a variety of Muslim groups, from 
across the political spectrum, would proceed on the understanding that complex forms of 
democratic politics, where citizens have widely different sets of beliefs, is a challenge for – 
and not an obstacle to – State-Muslim engagement.
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Identifying and describing what connections exist, if any, between antisemitism and both far right and Islamist extremism is a sensitive and complex task, especially regarding the 
question of antisemitic attitudes found within British Muslim communities. A degree of 
generalisation is inevitable, and this paper, perforce, focuses on the negative side of the story 
rather than the many positive examples of Muslim-Jewish friendship and cooperation, not 
least between my organisation, Community Security Trust (CST), and our counterparts at Tell 
MAMA (the service Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks), in our joint work combating anti-Jewish 
and anti-Muslim hate crime. But with those caveats in mind, it is possible to make some 
important and useful observations.
The first and most obvious point to make is that far right and Islamist extremists try to 
use antisemitism for political purposes. It can be argued that this political mobilisation of 
antisemitism is its defining characteristic, which differentiates it from other forms of bigotry. 
This is most commonly found in antisemitic conspiracy theories that blame a Jewish ‘hidden 
hand’ for the ills of a particular society, party or community; and that accuse Jews of ‘dual 
loyalty’ – the idea that Jews are loyal only to each other or, nowadays, only to Israel.
This political use of antisemitism by far right parties and movements form a familiar and tragic 
part of European history. In recent years explicit antisemitism has largely disappeared from 
the public propaganda of Britain’s main far right movements, but the underlying ideas remain 
in euphemistic references to ‘international finance’ or ‘Zionist businessmen’. In 2000, British 
Nationalist Party (BNP) Chairman Nick Griffin advised BNP writers to get around the law by 
using “Zionists” as a euphemism for “Jews” when writing articles. This is not to suggest that 
anybody who criticises Zionism is antisemitic; just to note that genuine antisemites developed 
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the Iraq war on what he called Tony Blair’s “pro-Israeli big business backers”. In 2006 he 
changed tack, publicly denouncing antisemitic conspiracy theorists as “Judeo-obsessives”; 
only to return to their ranks a few years later in describing the English Defence League (EDL) 
as a “Zionist” plot.1 
Less well known is the use of antisemitism by Islamist extremist movements, again for 
their own political purposes. The Egyptian Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb, in his 1950s 
essay Our Struggle with the Jews, claimed that Muslim societies were threatened by large 
numbers of Muslims acting as “Jewish agents”. He included academics, writers, scientists, 
journalists and even Muslim religious authorities – all serving, he claimed, a vast Jewish 
conspiracy to undermine Islam. In this example, Qutb was using antisemitism not against 
Jews, but against Muslims who disagreed with him. In its leaflets, Hizb ut-Tahrir falsely 
describe Uzbek President Islam Karimov as Jewish, while in Britain, Islamist organisations 
regularly claim that British politicians and media are under the sway of Jewish or Zionist 
financial influence.2
Recently the question of antisemitism within British Muslim communities became a topic 
of mainstream debate, after the Labour peer Lord Ahmed was revealed to have blamed his 
2009 imprisonment for dangerous driving on a Jewish conspiracy. He was condemned by a 
range of Muslim commentators, one of whom, Mehdi Hasan of the Huffington Post, warned 
that antisemitism is “routine and commonplace” in “some sections of the British Muslim 
community.” “There are thousands of Lord Ahmeds out there”, he wrote: “mild-mannered and 
well-integrated British Muslims who nevertheless harbour deeply anti-Semitic views.”3 
Mehdi Hasan wrote from his own experiences; the research on this subject is limited and now 
a few years old, but what research exists tends to back up his claims. In 2006 polling by the 
Pew Research Center found that 47% of British Muslims said that they had an unfavourable 
opinion of Jews, compared to just 7% of the general population. For comparison, 28% of 
French Muslims, 44% of German Muslims and 60% of Spanish Muslims felt the same way. 
In 2005, Populus found that 46% of British Muslims agreed that “the Jewish Community in 
Britain...are in league with the Freemasons to control the media and politics.” 53% agreed 
that British Jews “have too much influence over the direction of UK foreign policy” and 37% 
agreed that they “are legitimate targets as part of the ongoing struggle for justice in the 
Middle East” (the poll did not clarify what they might be “targets” for). What we don’t know is 
whether these attitudes have changed in the past 7 or 8 years, and of course opinion polls 
come with their own limitations.4 
An attempt to find out what motivates anti-Jewish attitudes amongst young Muslims was 
made by Günther Jikeli, a German PhD student, who conducted street-based interviews in 
London, Paris and Berlin between 2005 and 2007. He identified four different arguments 
used by those interviewees who expressed anti-Jewish attitudes to justify their views: classical 
antisemitism, such as conspiracy theories; hostile attitudes towards Jews with reference to 
Israel; negative views of Jews based on Muslim or ethnic identity; and hostility towards Jews 
with no particular rationalisation given. When asked for the sources of their attitudes towards 
Jews, interviewees cited family, friends, media old and new, mosques and schools. None, so 
far as Jikeli’s published research shows, mentioned any involvement in extremist political 
movements.5 
After October 2000, Jewish communities across Western Europe experienced a surge of 
antisemitic hate crime that appeared to have been triggered by reactions to the Second 
Intifada, which began in Israel and the Palestinian territories that month.  Several Jewish 
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communities reported that the people responsible for these antisemitic hate crimes were more 
likely to be young people of Muslim or Arab background than had been the case in previous 
years. Many people found this observation unpalatable, but it reflected the perceptions of the 
Jewish communities in question. Precise data that confirms or refutes this perception is hard 
to come by. For Britain, the only publicly-available data come from the Antisemitic Incident 
Reports published by CST, which are based on information taken directly from victims and 
witnesses, from the police, and through CST’s own volunteer network. These show that, 
in general, most antisemitic incidents where CST received a description of the offenders 
were carried out by people of white appearance; but the data suggest that people of south 
Asian and Arab appearance are over-represented to a limited extent amongst antisemitic 
incident offenders. This is clearly not a precise measure of Muslim offenders, given the 
ethnic diversity of British Muslims and the religious diversity of south Asians and Arabs, nor 
should it be assumed that the religious beliefs or ethnic identity of any hate crime offender 
are the primary determinants of their offending. While a significant minority of antisemitic 
incident offenders of all backgrounds express extreme political views during the course of 
their offence, in relatively few cases is there anything more than superficial evidence that they 
are activists in extremist movements, whether that be far right, Islamist or any other kind.6 
The antisemitism of extremist movements finds its most acute expression in anti-Jewish 
terrorism. The shooting at a Jewish school in Toulouse in 2012 is a well known example; 
less well known is how close the United Kingdom has come to a similar tragedy. Between 
December 2010 and September 2011 four different terrorist plots in which violent jihadists 
targeted British Jews were uncovered by authorities in the UK and abroad. Attempts by neo-
Nazi terrorists to attack Jewish, Muslim and other minority targets have also been foiled by 
the police in recent years. Antisemitism and incitement to kill Jews are now a regular part of 
the ideological package that counter-terrorist police encounter in their investigations.
While many people in Jewish and Muslim communities try to reduce the impact of this 
extremist activity, far right extremists seek to exploit community tensions. In 2011 the BNP 
claimed that “Zionist neo-Conservatives” were behind the terrorism of both al-Qaeda and 
Anders Breivik. Muslims are currently the primary targets of the far right’s hatred while Jews 
are a historic enemy; but Muslims and Jews are assumed in the far right worldview to be 
mortal enemies of each other. Some on the far right settle this by choosing to target what they 
see as the greater of two evils – currently Muslims – but with an integrationist twist. The BNP 
justified their apparent repudiation of antisemitism partly on the grounds that “Israel is a part 
of Western, if not European, Civilisation, and the Arab world is not.” More subtly, antisemitism 
from Muslims is presented as one of the indicators of an alleged Muslim inability to absorb 
Western values and integrate into Western societies.7 
The EDL uses the antisemitism charge against Muslims with particular enthusiasm. They 
tried to recruit a Jewish EDL Division and EDL members wave Israeli flags at demonstrations. 
Again, this is both superficial and cynical. The Facebook pages of EDL members reveal plenty 
of antisemitism alongside their Islamophobia and racism, while the EDL Jewish Division 
never grew beyond single figures of active Jewish members. The issue has also been divisive: 
as the EDL has splintered into different factions, some of those who are opposed to its 
current leadership have returned to overt displays of old-style neo-Nazi antisemitism. But 
however cynical the EDL’s professed philosemitism, it still implicitly acknowledges that, in 
post-Holocaust Western Europe, opposition to antisemitism is generally seen as a ‘European’ 
value. 
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The EDL’s expressions of opposition to antisemitism align it with many groups on Europe’s 
new radical populist right, and it is a novel development that inverts the normal way in which 
far right movements mobilise antisemitism for political advantage. However, it is likely to fail 
for two reasons: first, because it is so transparently cynical and has been overwhelmingly 
rejected by British Jews; second, and the main reason for its likely failure, is because, even 
for the far right’s own purposes, it is based on a false premise. In 2008/9 German academics 
conducted polling in eight European countries for the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, to look at six 
different types of prejudice: antisemitism; anti-Muslim attitudes; anti-immigrant attitudes; 
racism; homophobia; and sexism. What they found were strong correlations across all six: 
that people who harboured any one of those prejudices were also likely to hold one or more 
of the others. The researchers called this “Group Focused Enmity”: a way of seeing society 
as a hierarchy of unequal groups, some of which are ‘out-groups’ that do not belong at all. 
They found that people who dislike Muslims are likely to also dislike Jews, and vice versa. In 
Britain, people who dislike immigrants are particularly likely to also dislike Muslims; and also 
to dislike Jews. They also found a strong correlation, especially in Britain, between Group 
Focused Enmity and ideological convictions associated with far right politics.8 This brings 
us to a conclusion that may seem like stating the obvious, but is worth stating nonetheless: 
that despite changes in the public propaganda of far right movements, as far as many of 
their potential supporters are concerned, hostility to Jews remains an important part of their 
xenophobic mindset.
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The concept of integration was introduced to the UK’s political agenda in the 1960s by Roy Jenkins, who defined it “not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal 
opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.” A 
nativist tradition in British politics – exemplified by Enoch Powell – was never comfortable 
with equality, diversity or tolerance, while the anti-racist movement saw the concept as 
insufficiently distinct from assimilation: there has thus never been a consensus around the 
term’s meaning, nor a political constituency backing it. 
Only in the present century, in the wake of the milltown riots and terrorist attacks of 2001, 
has the concept returned to the agenda, but with little clarity around what it might mean. 
Sarah Spencer, in her book The Migration Debate, proposes the following definition: it refers 
to the processes of interaction between migrants and the individuals and institutions of the 
receiving society that facilitate the socio-economic, cultural, social and civic participation of 
migrants and an inclusive sense of identity and belonging.1 
Two points are worth taking from this definition. The first is that it is not a single process but 
a whole family of processes occurring in different domains, each of which is clearly related 
to the others, but not in a straightforward way. The second is that it cannot be seen as the 
sole responsibility of an individual migrant or of a minority community, but rather that the 
institutions and public of mainstream society have a role, a stake and a responsibility too.
LOCALISM AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE
But how and where do these processes occur? Thinking about each of the domains of 
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than the nation-state. Socio-economic participation means above all participation in labour 
markets which are local, or at most regional, rather than national. Social interaction means 
interaction in real neighbourhoods, streets, libraries, playparks and sports fields – again, that 
is, at a profoundly local level. Civic engagement may mean participation in national electoral 
politics – but is more likely to mean involvement in a community. A sense of identity and 
belonging might be municipal or regional (feeling at home in your neighbourhood, becoming 
a Brummie or a Yorkshireman) as much as national. 
Both David Cameron and Ed Miliband have captured this well. Cameron in 2011 with his 
comment that: “Real communities are bound by common experiences… forged by friendship 
and conversation… knitted together by all the rituals of the neighbourhood, from the school 
run to the chat down the pub.”; and Miliband in 2012 when he observed that “the impact of 
change is often felt differently in different places.” 2
The evidence bears this out. Locality matters. I will illustrate this with just two examples. 
The 2011 Census has revealed not just the national transformation of Britain’s demography 
brought about by mass migration, but also its complex geography. Previously demographically 
diverse areas – “old contact zones”, as David Robinson puts it – have become more diverse, 
but it is in the previously more homogeneous “new contact zones” that the changes are more 
visible.3 Absolute numbers of migrants arriving in these previously more homogenous areas 
are often quite small and the proportions of migrants in the population remain low outside 
a few core areas. On paper, 6000 extra migrants in Fenland looks like nothing compared 
to a rise of 30,000 in Luton. But on the street, the long-settled might notice and feel the 
multiplication of the proportion in the new zones of encounter (like the 211% increase in 
Fenland) more than the higher numbers in traditional gateways.4
And these sorts of dynamics make a huge difference to the possibility of integration in a given 
area. To take the domain of local belonging, recent research by the Centre on Migration, 
Policy and Society (COMPAS) with new citizens asked them if they felt a sense of belonging in 
their area, and then analysed this using the Mosaic database used by market researchers. 
Respondents were much more likely to report that they belong most strongly if they live in 
postcodes in classic multicultural inner city areas, including relatively deprived high density 
social housing and urban terraces, than if they live in less deprived modern suburbs without 
a history and ethos of mixing.5 
The importance of local processes and a locality’s distinctive character is why a localist 
approach to integration is important and valuable. Indeed local authorities have taken a lead 
in developing innovative and effective work around integration, working in partnership with 
other local stakeholders. In Breckland, in the rural East of England, environmental health 
officers worked with local businesses, service providers and European agricultural labourers 
to deflect the sort of tensions that have developed in other comparable areas, for example by 
helping Portuguese and Polish café owners and retailers make their premises welcoming to 
English-speakers so they are seen as positive assets to the whole community. In Bermondsey in 
South London, Southwark council has worked with the voluntary sector, Millwall Football Club 
and tenants and residents associations to create a St George’s Day festival that is inclusive 
and celebratory both of the white working-class residents at the heart of the community and 
of newcomers. In Scotland, the Confederation of Scottish Local Authorities has developed a 
migrant toolkit that helps councils better understand their demographic profile (which might 
mean population decline in some areas) and to plan for change effectively. In Rushmoor and 
other areas where large numbers of Ghurkhas have arrived in a fairly short period, a Home 
Office Ghurkha Integration Fund has enabled local authorities to work intensively with both 
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Ghurkha and non-Ghurkha community groups to address the issues that have emerged as a 
result of rapid change.
But in returning to the multiple processes of integration, it is clear that these sorts of policies 
can only have purchase in some domains, for instance in forging local belonging: the “softer” 
elements. Looking at the “harder” domains – often more objectively measurable – the 
evidence is very clear that persistent disadvantages remain for migrants and minorities in 
general and for some groups in particular. 
BEYOND LOCALISM
This means that integration cannot be the remit of integration policy alone. Integration cannot 
be addressed in isolation from social justice and social mobility. In fact, integration policy may 
be much less important for facilitating integration than other policy areas, fields with “heavy-
lifting” capacity, as Shammit Saggar and Will Somerville put it, such as employment and 
education.
As Saggar and Somerville argue, this means we need a holistic approach to integration, 
an approach which asks how we can use mainstream policy to facilitate it. As Saggar and 
Sommerville say, the muddling along British approach to integration has “relied a great deal 
on pinpointing, adapting and targeting mainstream policies to reach the needs of immigrants 
and minorities” – but in an ad hoc rather than systematic way.6
The political scientist Peter Scholten refers to a welcome trend towards “deconcentration” of 
integration policy, with integration no longer seen as a discrete, stand-alone field but rather a 
collective policy.7 We can see this in three areas: mainstreaming in discourses, narratives that 
stress the diversity of the whole population rather than the needs of specific groups, seen in 
UK in the shift to a community cohesion approach that replaced a multicultural celebration of 
different identities with an emphasis on shared values and coming together; mainstreaming 
in policies, replacing group-targeted policies with an emphasis on generic policies, seen in 
an anti-discrimination framework which requires public authorities to “equality-proof” generic 
services; and mainstreaming in governance structures, creating mechanisms to co-ordinate 
work across different departments or levels of government.8 In a review of what works in 
integration policy, Vidhya Ramalingam has argued that “Policy makers need to move away 
from the current focus on perceived ‘problem’ communities, to [an approach] which sees 
integration as something much more comprehensive… a ‘whole of society’ or 360° approach 
- to ensure that no groups within society are left behind.”9 However, as Sarah Spencer has 
argued, we cannot address these persistent disadvantages without attending to integration’s 
foundations: the legal rights and responsibilities which make participation in each domain 
possible or impossible.10
THE NECESSARY INTEGRATION DEBATE
The UK has a uniquely complex web of entitlements and limitations on entitlements for 
the dizzying range of categories of migrant our immigration system creates. We need to 
acknowledge that there is a trade-off between restrictions and integration. 
How do we square politicians’ emphasis on learning English with the restrictions on access to 
English language provision? How do we reconcile limiting the right to family reunion with the 
goal of promoting family life? Should entitlement to housing be based on local belonging or 
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on severity of need? Are there principles by which some needs might justify jumping a queue 
to reach a rationed resource? Do only those born here have the right to even be in the queue? 
And for settled minorities, fundamental inequalities wired into our system (and worsening 
in the context of austerity) constitute a major barrier to successful integration. As shown 
in research by the Runnymede Trust and sociologists such as Anthony Heath, there are 
specific penalties in educational and labour market outcomes for particular ethnic and 
religious groups.11 We cannot discuss integration, therefore, without discussing racism – and 
especially the forms of everyday, institutional racism that subtly structure our workplaces and 
institutions of learning. 
But disadvantage is not an effect of ethnicity alone. White working class people face both 
damaging forms of everyday prejudice and objective disadvantage across several domains 
of social policy. Ignoring this has fostered a dangerous politics of resentment and backlash, 
a politics fed by the perception that decisions about immigration have been made without 
consulting the settled population.
In conclusion, then, a 360° approach must first of all be “smart” and evidence-based 
enough to allow mainstream levers to be calibrated to address the specific disadvantages 
faced by different social groups, without generating stigma for those groups. Secondly, a 
360° approach needs to attend to the human rights on which the possibilities of full social 
participation rest – but also emerge from an open, transparent debate on what is at stake. 
And, third, it needs to have the courage to talk about racism and class, while acknowledging 
as legitimate the concerns created by rapid demographic change. 
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Since 9/11 and 7/7 debates about integration started to focus on extremism within the Muslim community and very rapidly moved towards identifying a problem that there was 
a failure of ‘integration’ by Muslims. Within this debate Islam and Muslims were frequently 
‘blamed’ as being the cause of the problem: it was assumed that Muslims were ‘sleepwalking’ 
their way to segregation or because of their radically different values they were ‘choosing’ to 
cut themselves off and live in ghettos or ‘no go’ areas.
Despite evidence to the contrary, this paradigm of ‘blaming’ Muslims for extremism and a 
failure of integration has been dominant. Consequently, political solutions have been sought 
in anti-terrorism law or anti-radicalism strategies such as Prevent. Less attention has been 
paid to anti-discrimination law as a policy response that addresses problems of extremism 
through alleviating social exclusion that – in turn – ensures a greater level of integration. This 
is surprising because the Northern Ireland experience suggests that anti-discrimination law 
can be part of a range of policies that can address extremism, disadvantage and encourage 
integration. 
One example is the harmonized public sector equality duty (PSED) which was introduced by 
the Equality Act 2010 but which the new Coalition Government put under review as part of 
its ‘red tape challenge’.1 The independent review of the PSED has now reported and made 
recommendations for improvement, although there was disagreement about whether or not 
the PSED was operating as intended.2 
The present Coalition Government strategy of deeming the PSED part of red tape under-
estimates the potential for the PSED to contribute towards the goals of reducing disadvantage 
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and implemented in Northern Ireland to reconcile Protestant and Catholic communities as 
part of the peace efforts.
The equality duty was first introduced by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 requiring 
public bodies to take proactive steps to achieve racial equality. Duties covering disability and 
gender were subsequently introduced in the Equality Act 2006. The PSED has now been 
extended in a harmonized way across all the equality grounds of not only race, gender and 
disability but also religion and belief, sexual orientation and age. The equality duty is the main 
policy lever that requires national and local government to mainstream equality and non-
discrimination into national and local public structures. 
In the present context, the mechanism of the public sector equality duty could provide a 
unique opportunity to consult widely with local groups in the design of public policies to ensure 
that potential conflicts are minimized or resolved before they become entrenched. This is a 
proactive promotion of equality which can prevent conflicts that could lead to costly litigation 
and tensions in community relations. Moreover, a harmonized PSED has the potential to 
ensure that less powerful groups within religious or racial minorities – e.g. women, lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender people, young and older people – are consulted as part of the 
process of public consultation prior to the design of public services. The duty also requires 
public authorities to gather baseline evidence on discrimination and equality across their 
functions. It provides a mechanism for monitoring, consultation and training that has the 
potential to cover all discrimination grounds. This allows the development of public services 
that are more appropriate for their users, potentially taking into account any tensions and 
conflicts between groups before policy decisions are finalized. 
The more inclusive public institutions which should result from a harmonized public sector 
equality duty would also better promote equality, integration and community cohesion. The duty 
can contribute to cohesion and help to minimize conflict by ensuring that the needs of minority 
religious groups are aligned with the needs of other religious and non-religious social groups in 
the community through a process of consultation, negotiation and compromise. 
It has been argued that the new duty should not cover religion or belief in the same way that 
it covers the other equality grounds. However, merely consulting with religious or belief groups 
does not mean that public authorities have to implement all of the demands of such groups. 
And consultation with, or accommodation of, religious groups does not give them a veto; and 
nor is consultation in itself a breach of the principle of secularism which is a principle that 
applies to the institutional separation of religion and state.
This process of mainstreaming the needs of religious minorities is a disincentive to them 
setting up parallel community structures where there is no regulation and no protection 
for vulnerable groups. It also provides an opportunity for public authorities to promote the 
wider goals of equality and non-discrimination within religious minorities. The process of 
consultation, negotiation and compromise with the local community ensures that members 
of both majority and minority communities are involved in this decision-making process. 
This process also ensures greater transparency so that local people feel involved in and can 
challenge public decision-making. As the public sector is a leader in shaping attitudes, the 
positive duty could help ensure that individuals are treated as equal citizens, and this focus 
on equality will also shape broader social attitudes.
It is also sometimes argued that there should be no public sector equality duty in relation 
to religion or belief because of a risk of harm to women. In fact, the exact opposite is true: 
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a harmonized public sector equality duty is essential to prevent harm to women in religious 
minorities. Tackling violence against minority women requires appropriately designed services 
that meet the needs of women in religious communities – e.g. domestic violence support 
that targets Muslim or Hindu women – designed after full consultation with women from 
those communities. A harmonized equality duty should require public authorities to cross-
refer gender with religion or belief to ensure that vulnerable women are protected through 
appropriate service delivery. 
The PSED, for all these reasons, is a key legal and policy lever to encourage integration for 
all social groups, but especially for religious groups such as British Muslims who experience 
social-economic disadvantage as well as being associated with political violence and extremist 
ideas. A harmonized public sector equality duty gives central and local government, as well as 
pubic decision-makers, a key legal and social policy tool to address disadvantage, extremism 
and promote integration.
1 See announcement of the Home Secretary on 15 May 2012 to set up an independent enquiry into whether 
the PSED in the Equalities Act 2010 was operating as intended.
2 See The Independent Steering Group’s Report of the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) Review and 
Government Response, London: Government Equalities Office published on 6 September 2013.
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AFTERWORD
THE RIGHT HON BARONESS WARSI
I am delighted that the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism and the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society have compiled essays from their symposium in the Houses 
of Parliament in May 2013. It was a hugely successful event and I was fortunate enough to 
attend and chair part of the discussion. 
These essays are thought-provoking and timely; they offer key commentary on some of 
the most pressing issues we face in society, from far right extremism to antisemitism and 
Islamophobia. Understanding these phenomena is crucial to ridding them from our society 
– something the current government is committed to doing. In fact, the starting point of our 
approach to integration and extremism is that there is no place for hatred and intolerance of 
any kind in Britain. 
These academics’ findings make for compelling reading, and the Pears Institute and COMPAS 
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THE PEARS INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM
The Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism was established by the Pears Foundation 
and is based at Birkbeck, University of London. It is a centre of innovative research and 
teaching, contributing to discussion and policy formation on antisemitism and racism. It is 
both independent and inclusive. www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk
CENTRE ON MIGRATION, POLICY AND SOCIETY (COMPAS)
The Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) is an ESRC-funded Research Centre 
within the University of Oxford. Since 2003 COMPAS has established an international reputation 
for original research and policy relevance. It has undertaken a strategic programme of multi-
disciplinary social scientific research, publications and dissemination, events, knowledge 
transfer and user engagement activities with a broad set of academic and non-academic users 
in the UK and abroad. COMPAS research covers a spectrum of global migration processes and 
phenomena, from conditions in places of migrant origins, through to institutions and activities 
affecting mobility, to social and economic effects in receiving contexts. www.compas.ox.ac.uk
THE ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP AGAINST ANTISEMITISM
The All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism was established to combat 
antisemitism and help develop and seek implementation of effective public policy to combat 
antisemitism. With committed members and an enviable reputation within Westminster 
and Whitehall for its impartiality, integrity and measured approach, the Group enjoys unique 
standing. Administrative support is provided to the Group by the Parliamentary Committee 
Against Antisemitism Foundation. www.antisemitism.org.uk/parliament
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